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Introduction 
A dominant concern in discussions of the accountability crisis is the potential impact of 
blurring boundaries between public and private accountability regimes. Opponents of 
privatization (and pseudo-privatization) argue that the modes of accountability 
characteristically adopted by private institutions are inappropriate for their public 
counterparts. Organized labor movements in developing countries such as Indonesia provide 
useful examples with which to explore these claims. Normatively speaking, labor unions are 
inherently "public" bodies: they have uniquely public responsibilities - namely the 
procurement of social citizenship for working-class citizens - and they are subject to a 
distinctly public mechanism of accountability, namely electoral democracy. In contrast, the 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who have challenged, even undermined, unions' 
monopoly on worker representation in emerging economy contexts in recent decades are 
inherently private organizations that are not directly bound to the workers they serve. NGOs' 
growing engagement with labor issues is thus portrayed as bringing with it a shift away from 
the electoral mode of accountability considered synonymous with unions towards the inferior 
modes of accountability adopted by NGOs. 
Analyses of labor NGOs' growing involvement in labor issues highlight widely recognized 
concerns about labor NGOs' accountability to the workers who comprise their "target 
groups." However, they fail to acknowledge that many unions in emerging economies are 
only marginally, if at all, more accountable to workers. In Indonesia, both labor unions and 
labor NGOs are enmeshed in complex webs of accountability, in which their relationship 
with workers represents just one of many strands. These webs of accountability equally 
define - and limit - labor unions' and labor NGOs' abilities to "answer" to workers, suggesting 
that public accountability is perhaps sometimes more a product of the political and economic 
environments in which labor movement organizations operate than of the structures of those 
organizations themselves. 
This chapter begins by examining the arguments most often made about the differences 
between labor unions and labor NGOs and the effects those differences have on the nature 
and extent of their accountability to workers. It then explains the context in which NGOs 
came to dominate the Indonesian labor movement in the early 1990s and the web of 
accountability in which Indonesian labor NGOs and unions find themselves today. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the implications of the "accountability dilemma" faced by 
unions and labor NGOs. It argues that - despite their formally democratic accountability 
structures - Indonesian unions are not necessarily always more accountable to workers than 
their undemocratic labor NGO counterparts. This suggests that a multidimensional model of 
accountability is required that recognizes the impact that pressures associated with a 
particular environment have on labor movement organizations' ability to be accountable to 
workers. 
Questions of accountability in the labor sphere 
As unions are the primary organizational vehicle for workers' collective action, most 
discussions of accountability within the labor movement are located in the literature on labor 
union democracy where accountability is a major, if not always explicit, theme. Discussions 
of labor union accountability, like most discussions of public accountability, are generally 
framed in terms of a relationship between two entities: the institution whose level or type of 
public accountability is to be examined, and "the people" (or representatives of "the people") 
to whom (or to which) they are accountable. The idea of accountability is implicit in the 
analyses of tensions between unions' institutional interests and the interests of union members 
that characterize much of this literature.1 Scholars concerned with labor union democracy 
also raise the possibility that different unions may emphasize different measures of 
accountability.2 For example, Morris and Fosh identify four major models of labor union 
democracy, namely liberal pluralism (which stresses electoral accountability); consumer 
unionism (where accountability is measured through outcomes rather than internal 
processes); grassroots activism (which stresses accountability through direct collective 
decisionmaking); and individual accountability (which stresses the role of the state as an 
external arbiter of labor union democracy which guards against leaders' radicalism).3 Yet, 
although these modes of labor union democracy represent quite different approaches to labor 
unions' public accountability, a common premise underpins all four: that the public to which 
a union is accountable is comprised only of its due-paying members. 
NGOs' contribution to campaigns around labor issues may be increasingly acknowledged, but 
labor NGOs are seldom considered to be labor movement organizations in their own right 
because they are not organizations "by, for and of" workers. As a result, in contrast to the 
literature on labor union democracy, which focuses more or less entirely on unions' 
accountability to their worker-members, the much smaller literature on labor NGOs 
emphasizes NGOs' relative lack of accountability.4 Critiques of labor NGOs' accountability 
echo the three major concerns regarding NGO accountability more generally that Sasha 
Courville identifies in Chapter 11: that NGOs are insufficiently accountable to either their 
members or the groups they serve; that they are even less accountable to society as a whole; 
and that NGOs' multiple roles inherently diminish their ability to be accountable to workers 
because of the potential conflicts of interest inherent in seeking to meet the requirements of a 
whole range of different "publics".5 
Scholars like Gallin and Compa rightly argue that a labor NGO's public is much less clearly 
defined than that of a union because labor NGOs are closed-membership organizations whose 
members are generally middle-class activists who engage with labor issues on behalf of 
workers, in contrast to unions, which are open-membership, mass organizations comprised of 
workers themselves.6 In the case of labor NGOs engaged in grassroots organizing, it is often 
unclear whether those NGOs are accountable to the workers' groups they sponsor (if indeed 
they sponsor workers' groups); to all workers employed in a particular occupation, industry,. 
or sector; or to any workers at all. Furthermore, relatively few NGOs are involved in 
grassroots labor activism: in situations where local NGOs engage in advocacy on labor issues 
alongside other social issues such as human rights abuses and democracy, their "public" may 
be better defined as the entire local community than a much narrower constituency of 
workers. 
Even when workers are recognized as a part - big or small - of a labor NGO's public, the 
NGO's ability to be accountable to those workers is constrained by a whole range of factors. 
First, labor NGOs, like other NGOs, are principally dependent on external funding, 
sometimes supplemented by income generated by the NGO itself. It is often argued that labor 
NGOs' dependence on foreign donors means that they are primarily accountable "upwards" 
beyond national boundaries to the community of donors who support their work, rather than 
"downwards" to their target groups or even to society as a whole.7 A related issue is the 
extent to which local labor NGOs' links with, and dependence on, international organizations 
and transnational networks place them outside state systems of accountability and encourage 
them to pursue external agendas not necessarily compatible with the needs of workers in their 
particular host society. Another concern is that labor NGOs' own internal accountability 
structures are weak because NGOs are often "directed" by a founder or group of founding 
members who cannot be voted out or sacked, and are not subject to the same internal 
transparency requirements as other social organizations.8 
Perhaps the strongest theme in critiques of labor NGOs concerns the third point raised by 
Courville: that NGOs have multiple roles which inevitably create conflicts of interest, thus 
diminishing their ability to be accountable. As I have argued elsewhere,9 although labor 
NGOs should be considered part of the labor movement, it must be recognized that their 
organizational identities and operational imperatives are not necessarily wholly focused on 
their role within that movement. All local labor NGOs have multiple roles in the sense that 
they are engaged with worker communities and/or labor issues within a particular national 
setting on the one hand, and with their community of donors, which is most often 
international, on the other. Many local labor NGOs also adopt multiple "horizontal" roles, 
engaging directly with workers, becoming involved in national-level and transnational 
advocacy networks, and simultaneously taking on a range of projects (each potentially funded 
by a different donor) that focus on matters that may or may not be related to labor. Each of 
these roles comes with a specific set of expectations which NGOs must meet and measures 
through which NGOs' accountability must be demonstrated. It is not surprising that conflicts 
of interest arise, which may lead to accusations that the labor NGOs concerned are pursuing 
their own interests rather than the interests of the workers they claim to support.10 
On the surface, then, it appears that very different models are required to analyze the public 
accountability of unions and labor NGOs. However, evidence from developing-country 
contexts such as Indonesia suggests that differences between the types of accountability 
demanded from labor NGOs and unions may be less concrete than they first appear. Although 
labor unions operating in these contexts generally have fewer competing roles than labor 
NGOs, they are seldom accountable only to their members. Like local labor NGOs, they are 
required to be accountable to a whole range of other parties (such as to their often charismatic 
founders and to their own set of overseas donors) whose demands influence their ability to be 
accountable to their worker public. And also like local labor NGOs, unions in developing-
country contexts often lack organizational transparency or are not particularly internally 
democratic. This might be because of the dominant role of a central union executive or 
because of government-imposed restrictions on shop-floor organizing. Yet, whereas scholars 
are extremely cognizant of the risks competing claims on labor NGOs pose for their ability 
(and desire) to be accountable to workers, they assume that the definition of a union's public 
is unproblematic. In other words, unlike the literature on labor NGOs, scholarly accounts of 
labor union democracy focus on what unions' obligations to workers are and to what extent 
unions deliver on those obligations, but almost always fail to really ask to whom those unions 
are really accountable. 
The narrow focus in the labor union democracy literature is based on the assumption that 
unions are essentially, primarily, and uniquely accountable to their members because 
electoral procedures are used to select union leaders. But, while most unions' publics are 
indeed defined by membership (and within national boundaries), international unionism and 
transborder solidarity activities weaken the direct correspondence between a union's 
membership and its public. One example of this that is immediately obvious to students of 
emerging labor movements is the campaigns run by national unions' international solidarity 
organizations - such as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations' (AFL-CIO) solidarity wing, the American Center for International Labor 
Solidarity (ACILS). There is a clear distinction between the public served by unions' 
international solidarity organizations (generally located in emerging-economy contexts) and 
the members to whom the parent unions are electorally accountable in their country of 
origin.11 This means that, while the unionists and non-union workers targeted by a union's 
international programs in countries such as Indonesia are part of that union's public, they are 
not members of the group of workers to which that union is electorally accountable. 
The assumption that a union is only accountable to its membership has other implications for 
the relevance of the labor union democracy literature in the study of emerging labor 
movements. Most importantly, perhaps, it largely ignores the influence of other forms of 
accountability on a union's ability to be truly accountable to its worker public. In emerging-
economy contexts, at least two very tangible pressures impinge on a union's ability to be 
accountable to its worker public: state demands that unions be accountable to all citizens 
(where the means of "being accountable" is defined by the state); and donors' demands that 
unions be accountable for funds provided for union activities (where the nature and targets of 
those activities are often significantly influenced by the donor organizations concerned). 
The state's potential to determine unions' opportunities to organize and to limit their ability to 
be accountable solely to their members in all national contexts is widely recognized by labor 
scholars. However, the extent to which that potential is realized (and therefore the seriousness 
with which that potential is examined) varies enormously. In liberal democracies, the state's 
influence over unions changes over time, depending on variables such as the union 
movement's strength relative to other social interest groups or the extent to which the union 
movement is captured by state interests. The mainstream labor union democracy literature 
reflects this reality, with even theorists promoting the fourth model identified by Morris and 
Fosh - the model which identifies the state as a self-appointed gatekeeper of union 
accountability - assuming that a union's only public (and ultimate focus of union 
accountability) is its membership.12 However, as suggested by the emphasis on state-union 
relations in the literature on labor unions in emerging economies, particularly labor regimes 
underpinned by developmentalist models of corporatism,13 unions are often as, or even more, 
accountable to the state (theoretically representing "the people" as a whole) than to their own 
members. In what Alfred Stepan refers to as "exclusionary" state corporatist systems, 
"unions" are workers' organizations in nothing more than name. However, in many 
developing-country contexts, under what Stepan calls "inclusionary" state corporatism, 
unions simultaneously attempt to meet both the develop mentalist demands of the state and 
the demands of workers.14 This implies that unions in inclusionary state corporatist systems 
are accountable not only to their members, but also to a broader national public, courtesy of 
state demands that unions encourage their members to contribute to economic development 
rather than to fight for their "narrow" sectional interests at the expense of the national 
interest. 
Unions' lack of internally generated resources in emerging-economy contexts also impinges 
on their ability to be accountable to their members. In theory, unions' primary funding base is 
drawn from members' contributions, but the low wages of workers in emerging economies 
mean that financial assistance from abroad is often more important than members' dues in 
maintaining union facilities and activities.15 Members' dues alone seldom provide enough 
finance to obtain technologies now considered basic requirements even in emerging-economy 
contexts, such as computers and telephones, or to resource everyday union activities. External 
funding (from international or transnational union bodies, or from other sources including 
international NGOs) provides a union with the wherewithal to acquire the technology 
required to achieve their organizational aims and to fund grassroots organizing activities. 
However, that funding is accompanied by many pressures. International funding bodies 
seldom provide resources to all unions in a particular national context - they pick "winners" 
that match their expectations of what a union is and does. Nor is international funding bodies' 
provision of resources unconditional: whether funding is provided for particular projects or 
for general running expenses, international funding bodies generally specify what types of 
expenses are acceptable and what outcomes they expect. To whom, then, in these conditions, 
is a union accountable? To its members, who may or may not pay the dues that represent such 
a small part of a union's operating budget, or to the donors who fund the bulk of it? 
As this discussion has suggested, it is not necessarily helpful to focus simply on unions and 
workers - or even on unions, workers, and labor NGOs - when discussing the accountability 
of emerging labor movement organizations for two reasons. First, it is often not the case that 
the public to which labor movement organizations are accountable consists entirely of 
worker-members. Unions and local labor NGOs working at the local level in emerging-
economy contexts are subject to multiple layers of accountability, which impact on their 
ability to be publicly accountable at all. Secondly, as both labor unions and local labor NGOs 
operate in particular national contexts, their ability to be accountable to workers is influenced 
by the political and economic specificities of those contexts. This means that, even if we 
define all labor movement organizations' public narrowly as consisting of workers (in the 
case of NGOs) or worker-members (in the case of unions), we cannot ignore either the 
context in which they operate or the other sorts of accountability to which these organizations 
are subject, because they impact on unions' and labor NGOs' ability to be accountable to that 
worker public. 
Union and labor NGO accountability in Indonesia 
The Indonesian case provides a particularly fertile context in which to explore the nuances of 
labor union and labor NGO accountability, not least because labor NGOs played a pivotal 
role in the reconstruction of the labor movement between 1985 and 2005 - a labor movement 
decimated by Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime (1967-1998) in the preceding two 
decades.16 Labor NGOs' intense and relatively long involvement at both the grassroots and 
the policy advocacy levels of the Indonesian labor movement, in conjunction with the 
reemergence of independent unions after the fall of Suharto in 1998, provides a wealth of 
examples through which the extent and nature of labor movement organizations' 
accountability to a worker-public can be examined. 
Indonesia has a long history of organized labor.17 Unions played an important role in the 
nationalist movement in the late colonial period (to 1945) and under Indonesia's first 
President, Sukarno (1945-1967). However, organized labor entered a new phase when 
Suharto's New Order seized power in 1966-1967 after an attempted coup and the ensuing 
massacre of Indonesians associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai 
Komunis Indonesia) and other leftist groups. Building on the concepts of functional groups 
formulated during the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965), the New Order encouraged 
unionists who had survived the purges of left-wing union activists carried out in 1965 to 
establish the All-Indonesia Labor Federation (FBSI, Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), a 
single peak body comprised of twenty-one industrial sector unions.18 State control of 
organized labor reached new heights in 1985, when the FBSI was replaced by a single union 
called the All-Indonesia Workers' Union (SPSI, Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia).19 
Suharto's New Order imposed a series of structural and ideological controls on the forms of 
representation available to workers.20 Structurally, workers were integrated into the New 
Order's broader system of organic state corporatism, in which designated social interest 
groups (including labor, but also groups such as women and youth) were each "represented" 
by a single, state-sanctioned mass movement organization.21 Ideologically, labor unions, 
along with the other "functional group" organizations in the system, were expected to 
promote the interests of the "community" as a whole rather than the interests of their 
members. This had very real consequences for the nature of unionism, and the state-
sanctioned union's relationship with its worker-members. There was little pretence of 
electoral labor union democracy in New Order Indonesia, as the state both provided the bulk 
of the union's financial resources and appointed union officials - many of whom were 
bureaucrats or even entrepreneurs.22 Although the SPSI was officially restructured as a 
federation in 1993 (FSPSI, Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia) and unaffiliated 
enterprise unions were permitted from 1994, little real change was achieved before the fall of 
the Suharto presidency in 1998.23 In practice, the New Order government effectively 
maintained a one-union policy by preventing alternative unions organizing above plant 
level.24  
It was in this context that NGOs became involved in labor organizing in Indonesia in the 
1980s and 1990s.25 The first labor NGOs were established by disenchanted unionists and 
human rights activists between 1978 and 1985. By 1991, labor NGOs had become the major 
proponent of the right to form independent workers' organizations, and, by 1998, more than a 
dozen labor NGOs had emerged in the regions of Greater Jakarta and West Java alone, whilst 
others were established in the industrial cities of Surabaya and Medan, and later in less 
industrialized cities and provincial towns.26 
Unlike the Philippines or Malaysia, where labor NGOs have mostly been active on the 
fringes of traditional labor union activity,27 Indonesia's labor NGOs engaged very broadly in 
the labor movement. In addition to the advocacy, educative, and campaign functions 
commonly associated with labor NGOs worldwide, Indonesia's labor NGOs became involved 
in grassroots industrial organizing, generally considered the heartland of union activity in 
other countries. Individual NOOs concerned with industrial labor tended to adopt one of these 
two primary strategies, although some combined both.28 Some worked mostly at the 
grassroots level in an attempt to compensate for the failures in the operation of the official 
union, using a combination of legal advocacy, workers' education, and associated activities, 
which usually involved either sponsoring or cooperating with workers' groups. Others 
focused primarily on policy advocacy or research, engaging in local and international 
campaigns about labor rights violations, publishing independent assessments of labor 
conditions, and attempting to engage the government in a public dialogue about military 
involvement in industrial relations and problems in the implementation of existing labor law. 
Local NGOs became involved in labor issues precisely because both the state-sponsored 
union, and the state itself, were seen to be insufficiently accountable to either workers or the 
general public on labor issues. Consequently, their demands focused on the legal and policy 
reforms required to provide greater protection for individual workers and ensure workers' 
access to their collective right to form independent unions. Labor NGO activists' attempts to 
achieve better conditions for workers were not always successful. The limited organizational 
reach of these NGOs meant that they had direct contact with only a small percentage of 
Indonesian workers employed in the manufacturing sector. Their attempts to encourage the 
formation of independent workers' organizations (while quite fruitful in many instances) were 
also inhibited by a whole range of structural factors such as high worker turnover.29 However, 
labor NGOs' high-profile campaigns on issues ranging from the minimum wage to military 
involvement in labor disputes attracted international attention and forced the Suharto regime 
to significantly modify some aspects of its labor policy. In short, while NGOs' involvement in 
labor issues theoretically threatened the public accountability of the labor movement by 
shifting the locus of labor movement activism at least partially away from labor unions, in 
practice labor NOO activism demonstrably increased the state's accountability to the public 
on labor issues through their advocacy campaigns and grassroots activities. 
Labor NGOs - like other groups opposed to the New Order - were subjected to bureaucratic, 
legal, and even physical sanctions, including military raids and even imprisonment.30 
However, their links with international NGOs (in conjunction with their connections with key 
reformist figures within the political elite) accorded the mainly middle-class labor NGO 
activists a measure of protection not enjoyed by worker-activists. Courville notes that NGOs 
more generally are often criticized for their lack of accountability to the community as a 
whole,31 but it was precisely because of labor NOOs' lack of integration within the New 
Order's corporatist system that they were organizationally more able to defy the New Order 
state than domestic mass organizations, including unions. This lack of integration enabled 
labor NGOs to circumvent anti-union regulations and criticize the New Order's labor 
relations policy and practices with relative impunity, because they did not directly challenge 
the one-union system. 
In contrast, despite the NGO connections of two of the three "alternative" unions of the late 
Suharto period, these "alternative" unions fared less well, primarily because their stated 
desire to formally register as unions posed a direct threat to the New Order's one-union 
policy. The first, the Solidarity Free Trade Union (SBM-SK, Serikat Buruh Merdeka-
Setiakawan), was never officially banned, but disintegrated less than two years after it was 
established in September 1990 as a result of disagreements about whether it should take an 
industrial or political role.32 Two years later, Muchtar Pakpahan's union, the Indonesian 
Prosperous Labor Union (SBSI, Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia), was set up. Pakpahan, a 
lawyer and former labor NGO activist, was imprisoned by Suharto for his union activities in 
1994 after the SBSI was accused of inciting race riots in the Sumatran city of Medan. Dita 
Sari's Indonesian Center for Labor Struggle (PPBI, Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia) was 
established in 1994, but was effectively destroyed in mid-1996 when Dita Sari and other 
PPBI activists were jailed for subversion. Although the SBSI survived and the PPBI 
regrouped after the fall of Suharto as the National Front for Indonesian Workers' Struggle 
(FNPBI, Front Nasional Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia), all three of those "alternative unions" 
faced far more serious persecution by the military and the bureaucracy than their labor NGO 
counterparts in late New Order Indonesia. 
Tensions created by contradictions between labor NGOs' responsibilities not only to workers, 
but also to donors, the international and local NOO communities, and to NGO activists 
themselves, were evident throughout the 1990s.33 Interviews with activists conducted in 
1999, 2000, and 2001 found that criticisms made of labor NGOs by workers, unionists, and 
even labor NGO activists themselves, centered on a number of interrelated concerns. The first 
of these was individual and organizational competition, driven at least in part by the strong 
convictions of the middle-class activists that control most labor NGOs and in part by 
pressures to appear more successful than other labor NGOs in order to compete for donor 
funding. Activists interviewed referred to both "individual egotism" (for example, personally 
claiming credit for organizing a campaign actually organized by a number of NGO activists) 
and "institutional egotism" (for example, claiming credit for a demonstration actually 
organized by either workers or another labor NGO). The second major concern identified by 
interviewees was donors' priorities, which respondents saw as a major force driving labor 
NGOs' agendas, particularly where funding was project-based. Donors' priorities (and 
accompanying funding opportunities) can divert NGO activists' attention from existing 
projects, and determine what new projects are established. Respondents argued that changing 
donor priorities demonstrably created a series of "fads" where labor NGOs almost all 
suddenly turned their attention to a particular issue (such as gender) for which funding was 
available. A related concern identified in these interviews was that labor NGOs' need to 
ensure their organizational viability often resulted in conflict between their interests and the 
interests of workers, for example, cases where labor NGOs had insisted that the worker 
groups they sponsored deal with a donor through the NGO rather than by approaching the 
donor directly, or where labor NGOs stopped supporting particular worker-activists because 
they had established contact with a rival labor NGO. 
As labor NGOs have no formal mechanisms through which they are held accountable to 
workers involved in their programs, it can be argued that workers have little means to hold 
NGOs accountable beyond choosing whether or not to participate in activities sponsored by a 
particular NGO. However, this logic does not explain why similar criticisms were made 
about the alternative unions of the period. Although all three alternative unions were headed 
by non-worker labor activists, relied on financial and political support from overseas, and had 
no formal access to the machinery of industrial relations, structurally they were very different 
from the labor NGOs. In contrast to the labor NGOs' closed membership structure, they were 
open-membership organizations that had worker-members to whom they were formally 
accountable. Nevertheless they too were criticized for using workers for their own ends, and 
were accused of being captured by personal or institutional egotism.34 
Worker criticisms of both labor NGOs and independent unions were voiced much more 
openly after the fall of Suharto.35 Initially, it seemed as if labor NGOs had outlived their 
usefulness after the lifting of policy restrictions on independent unionism by Suharto's 
successor, President Habibie. But many of the tens of thousands of unions that sprang up 
after the fall of Suharto were in fact yellow unions, sponsored by companies in an attempt to 
prevent independent unions from entering a workplace, or vehicles for individuals' or non-
union organizations' political aspirations. Even unions genuinely concerned with their 
worker-members faced many of the same challenges experienced by labor NGOs. Despite 
independent labor unions' newfound ability to organize openly, access the shop floor, and 
engage in collective bargaining, they continued to suffer from the same general kinds of 
accountability problems as those which plagued lahor NGOs. 
Like labor NGOs, Indonesia's new unions tend to be driven by individual personalities. 
Although these unions are theoretically electorally accountable to their members, in fact, as 
Gerard Greenfield notes, many union leaders “are not directly elected by the rank-and-file, 
but are appointed by a central executive committee which itself is not elected but is decided 
through closed discussion among an elite core of activists.”36 This has been a problem not 
only in small unions or in the local branches of large unions, but also in major independent 
unions, most notably the SBSI (which was restructured after the fall of Suharto as a 
Confederation known as the KSBSI). Muchtar Pakpahan continued to serve as the union's 
chair despite criticisms from his former NGO colleagues and some worker-activists who felt 
that the union should be headed by a worker rather than a non-worker intellectual, and in 
2002-2003, the KSBSI experienced a major split as a result of accusations that Pakpahan was 
politicizing the union and using union resources to promote his political party.37 
Accountability problems are also evident in unions' funding arrangements. All three major 
union confederations claim large numbers of members and all have intricate funding 
formulae, but the majority of their members are not due-paying.38 The issue of due collection 
is a complex one because the low earning base of most Indonesian workers restricts the levels 
at which dues can be set. In addition, the availability of relatively large amounts of external 
funding has made the difficult work of due collection unattractive especially for large unions, 
whilst at the same time leaving unions vulnerable to pressure from donors. For example, the 
KSBSI's triennial report shows that member income accounted for just 2.3 percent of its total 
income in the period between May 2000 and February 2003. Some 84 percent of the KSBSI's 
income in that same period came from overseas donations, whilst a further 3.5 percent was 
obtained in the form of overseas loans.39 
Most importantly, perhaps, foreign interest groups have also been very active in directly 
reshaping the Indonesian labor movement. In August 1998, the American solidarity 
organization, the ACILS, supported a split in the FSPSI, the official union of the New Order 
period, which resulted in the formation of FSPSI-Reformasi. In 1999, the ACILS sponsored 
again the creation of new peak union bodies, neither of which survived.40 Finally, in 2002, 
the Indonesian Trade Union Congress (KSPI, Kongres Serikat Pekerja Indonesia) was 
established, this time with the tacit support of the ICFTU. The KSBSI continued to receive 
significant training and financial support from the ACILS, as did even the FNPBI, despite its 
focus on political action rather than factory-based organizing.41 
Webs of accountability 
The similarities described here between the limits on labor unions' and labor NGOs' levels of 
accountability to workers can be at least partially explained by the context in which they 
operate. Although the Indonesian labor movement had a relatively strong organizational 
culture before Suharto came to power in 1967, the long years of the New Order destroyed 
much of that culture, leaving workers suspicious of unionism (because of its perceived 
associations with communism) and unused to demanding accountability from union leaders.42 
Indeed, a strong focus in labor NGOs' educational programs both before and after the fall of 
Suharto has been to train workers to expect - and implement - democratic procedures in their 
organizations. However, structurally, Indonesian unions face a much bigger challenge than 
their poor internal procedures: like labor NGOs, they are embedded in a web of non-worker 
accountability that diminishes their ability to be accountable to workers. 
The webs of accountability that ensnare Indonesia's labor unions and labor NOOs have both 
international and domestic dimensions. Labor NOOs and unions are heavily influenced by 
organizations based outside Indonesia, primarily international unions, transnational union 
solidarity organizations (some of which are structured as NGOs), and international NGOs. 
Indonesian unions and labor NGOs rely heavily on the same set of international donors for 
funding, which is either project- or time-based. For example, the Netherlands Organization 
for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB, Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Internationale Bijstand) provided recurring base funding for some NGO-sponsored workers' 
groups which succeeded in registering as unions after 1998, while the German labor NGO, 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), has been a long-time 
contributor to union training programs and NGO initiatives. For example, the FES funded an 
NGO labor clipping service, Problema, for approximately a decade beginning in the early 
1990s,43 Some solidarity organizations worked primarily with the official union during the 
Suharto period (for example the Australian Council of Trade Unions' solidarity NGO, 
APHEDA). Others, including the ACILS, provided a combination of project-based aid and 
recurring funding for both labor NGOs and alternative unions. Although union solidarity 
organizations such as the ACILS have focused almost exclusively on the major union 
confederations since 1998, they continue to work at some level with some of the labor NGOs 
they formerly funded on a regular basis.44 Meanwhile, international NGOs such as the Ford 
Foundation continue to fund a range of local NGOs' labor-related activities, for example the 
publication of research and worker magazines.45 
External funding brings with it formal responsibilities not only for financial accountability, 
but for program design which meets the terms of reference (TORs) donors set out for 
particular projects. Although donor TORs do not necessarily set unions' or labor NGOs' 
agendas, they certainly influence them.46 In addition, donor-funded programs can suddenly 
stop because a project comes to an end, or donor priorities change. While these programs are 
clearly aimed at helping Indonesian workers, workers have no formal control over their 
content or implementation - control they theoretically would if those programs were funded 
from union dues or on a user-pays basis. 
Labor unions and local labor NGOs are also drawn into domestic webs of accountability 
deriving from personal and institutional alliances.47 These internal webs are less formal than 
the external webs (particularly those that bind unions and labor NGOs to donors), but they are 
no less influential. As is the case at the international level, there is not always a clear divide 
between union and labor NGO networks. At one end of the spectrum, many local-level 
unions registered after 1998 grew out of NGO-sponsored workers' groups, and retained close 
(albeit often fraught) relationships with those NGOs.48 At the other end of the spectrum, some 
key personnel in at least two of the major union confederations have links with NGOs, either 
as former NGO activists, or as worker-activists who were strongly influenced by NGO 
training. The strength of these union-NGO networks is demonstrated by initiatives such as the 
union-labor NGO forum initiated by activists in East Java in 2002. Furthermore, although 
conditions for labor organizing have improved markedly in Indonesia since the fall of 
Suharto, the organized labor movement is still far from institutionally stable.49 Individual 
labor movement organizations rely heavily on the goodwill of others - goodwill which is 
often undermined by institutional jockeying for status with particular groups of workers or 
with donors. Unions and labor NGOs are thus also informally accountable to their peers - a 
form of accountability which, again, excludes workers. 
Conclusion: the accountability dilemma 
There is growing recognition in the scholarly and activist communities that unions are not the 
only kind of organizations that can promote labor interests. Contemporary labor activism in 
emerging-economy contexts occurs through at least two very different organizational forms. 
On the one hand are the labor unions, structured according to long-cherished traditions 
around struggles to promote the common interests of their worker-members, who are 
generally drawn from a particular occupation, industrial sector, or region. On the other hand, 
there are local labor NGOs: closed-membership "other-centered" organizations of generally 
middle-class activists which work on behalf of "target groups" of workers. 
Analyses of the form and focus of labor union and labor NGO accountability are largely 
predicated on these differences in membership structure and class background. The literature 
on trade union democracy recognizes that unions may be held accountable in different ways, 
but assumes that all unions are always - and only - accountable to their worker-members 
because those worker-members have a right to hold their unions accountable through 
electoral processes. In contrast, scholars emphasize the impermanence and incompleteness of 
labor NGOs' commitment to workers, based on suspicions about their motives and 
assumptions about their priorities. Evidence from the Indonesian context in no way negates 
the organizational differences between labor unions and labor NGOs. However, it does 
indicate that models of labor union accountability premised on a single, particular 
relationship between labor movement organizations and workers are fundamentally flawed. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the accountability webs in which Indonesia's new "real" 
unions find themselves are little different from those that surround the labor NGOs they are 
supposed to make redundant, which in turn suggests that public accountability is not as much 
a product of one's choice of institutional regime as it is of the micro-dynamics that shape the 
institution's needs and capacities. 
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